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Representing the Media at Trial
by Richard M. Goehler, Joseph A. Tomain, and Amanda G. Main
More than most types of litigants, the media faces bias the
moment it walks into a courtroom. Nearly everyone these days
holds a strong opinion-and generally, it's negative-about
the people who produce newspaper copy and television pro-
gramming. While many other varieties of cases attract little
attention, the media becomes news whenever it goes on trial.
Thus, when media clients are parties in litigation, public atti-
tudes toward the press have a significant impact on the
litigation strategy. Successful strategies of media counsel must
include evidentiary, procedural, and substantive legal consid-
erations, as well as a plan for delivering a theme that
overcomes negative opinions held by the most important
members of the public at that time: the judge and jury.
Over the past 20 years, public opinion of the media has con-
tinually declined. Americans seem to think journalists are
sloppier, less professional, less moral, more slanted, and gen-
erally more harmful to democracy than they were in the 1980s.
The State of the News Media 2004, an annual report on
American journalism available at www.journalism.org,
reflects that between 1985 and 2002:
" The percentage of Americans who think news organiza-
tions are highly professional declined from 72 to 49
percent.
* Those who think news organizations are moral declined
from 54 to 39 percent, while those who think they are
immoral rose from 13 to 36 percent.
" People who believe news organizations try to cover up
their mistakes rose from 13 to 67 percent, and Americans
who think news organizations accurately report facts
declined from 55 to 35 percent.
Richard M. Goehler and Joseph A. Tomain are with Frost Brown Todd
LLC in the Cincinnati, Ohio, office. Amanda G. Main is with Brown-Forman
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" Those who feel news organizations care about the people
they report on declined from 41 to 30 percent.
" Those who think news organizations are politically biased
rose from 45 to 59 percent.
Clearly, media defense counsel have their work cut out for
them in court. Given the public's inherent distrust of the media-
and judges of course read the papers and watch TV news,
too--cases involving media clients often hinge not just on legal
arguments but on popular opinion about the media's conduct
and motives. From our standpoint, the media clients we serve
answer a noble calling. They ferret out facts, help us recog-
nize and celebrate great events, and expose and explain
reprehensible conduct. They tell us what we all need to know
to remain informed and enlightened, and provide entertain-
ment. Sometimes they even provide information and
entertainment simultaneously, like The Colbert Report.
Every profession, however, has room for improvement A
gross generalization, but one based on experience, is that some
journalists and other people working in the media fail to articu-
late the importance of getting news and information out the door
quickly, and the chaotic process that it sometimes entails. In 2005,
for example, the Boston Herald faced the blowback of public
skepticism in a defamation case brought against it by
Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Ernest Murphy. In Murphy
v. Boston Herald, the newspaper went to trial to defend an
allegedly false report that Judge Murphy gave lenient treatment to
criminal defendants and had made an insensitive comment to a
teenage rape victim. Counsel for the Boston Herald faced the huge
challenge of overcoming its own reporter's deposition testimony.
In one exchange, Judge Murphy's counsel asked journalist David
Wedge if he had thought about the consequences of his articles.
Q: Mr. Wedge, did you consider the impact that your
stories on Judge Murphy would have on him before
you published them?
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A: No.
Q: Did you consider the impact that your stories would
have on his family, his wife, and five children before
you published them?
A: No.
Q: Have you ever considered either of those things?
A: No.
Q: Do you know the impact your stories have had on
Judge Murphy and his five children?
A: No.
Q: Do you care?
A: No.
A Massachusetts jury found in favor of Judge Murphy, sad-
dling the Herald with a $2 million libel verdict. The Herald
has filed post-trial motions and is considering an appeal.
The Media Law Resource Center (MLRC), a nonprofit
media industry organization, maintains statistics about libel
and privacy verdicts involving the media. The mixed results
perhaps reflect society's declining attitude toward the media.
In its report Trials Against the Media, 1980-2004, the MLRC
tracked 527 cases that had reached trial, involving libel, pri-
vacy, and related claims against media defendants. Of those
cases, the plaintiffs prevailed in nine by default, and mistri-
als were declared in 12. Of the 506 remaining cases in which
trial verdicts were rendered, the media defendants won only
39.3 percent. Statistics like these naturally do not bode well
for media clients and their trial counsel. Therefore, develop-
ing strategies to overcome the common hurdle of antimedia
bias is crucial when these cases go to trial.
Voir dire is the first opportunity to discover and overcome
bias. Direct questions such as "Are you biased against the
media?" are generally ineffective in learning what prospec-
tive jurors actually think. A more successful strategy may be
to ask about their experiences with the media.
In a libel and privacy case we tried last year, Darcie
Divita, a television personality in Louisville, Kentucky, sued
her former boyfriend, John Ziegler, based on comments he
made about her on the air. Ziegler was a very controversial
figure on morning radio in the Louisville market. Listeners
of his show heard a shock-jock-style format somewhere
between Rush Limbaugh and Howard Stern, layered with
Ziegler's own unique personality. His topics varied from
conservative political discussions with a libertarian bent, to
his personal life, to irreverent topics like the Michael
Jackson saga.
In his first few weeks on air, Ziegler received reams of let-
ters and phone calls from angry listeners and sponsors after
questioning the Catholic faith's practice of receiving com-
munion. Ziegler, a former seminary student, described how
Catholics believe their communion host and wine actually
turn into the body and blood of Christ at the time it is con-
sumed. He wondered why people would honor their god by
eating him and then passing him through their digestive sys-
tems. A bachelor, Ziegler often would discuss the Louisville
dating scene-or the lack thereof. He frequently discussed
his relationships with women, and he would elicit listener
feedback on whether they thought he had had a good or bad
date. Once he had callers vote on whether he should have sex
with an ex-girlfriend when she came to town. He never men-
tioned her or other love interests by name unless they were in
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the public eye. So when Ziegler dated Divita, her public fig-
ure status and the public nature of their relationship allowed
him to share juicy particulars with his listening audience.
Divita had moved to Louisville in early winter 2003 to
begin her new position as a morning television co-anchor. At
that time, Ziegler was Louisville's number-one-rated radio
talk-show host. Before Divita even moved to Louisville, a
talk-show host at Ziegler's radio station suggested on the air
that she go on a date with Ziegler. They did. Additionally,
Divita appeared on Ziegler's show a few times, took a com-
patibility quiz on the air, and discussed their first date on
another radio show; and he appeared on her local television
morning show. They dated for several months. In short,
Divita and Ziegler voluntarily. participated in a unique "real-
ity relationship" that had a public element to it from day one.
In August 2003, Divita's employment with the television
station ended. That same day, Ziegler offered strongly
opinionated comments about her on the air. He also
answered callers' questions concerning intimate details
about Divita-including statements regarding Divita's
breast augmentation, grooming habits, and sexual behavior,
as well as his opinion that she might be a pathological liar.
Divita sued Ziegler and the radio station in a Kentucky
state court, alleging claims of defamation, portraying her in
a false light, public disclosure of private facts, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Ken Sales represented
We asked prospective
jurors about watching
reality television.
Ziegler. We represented 84-WHAS, the radio station that
employed Ziegler. With television cameras in the courtroom
every day, the eyes of Louisville watched two former local
celebrities provide an encore to their reality relationship.
Our trial was the top story most of the week on the local
news, even though a high-profile murder trial was going on
at the same time in another courtroom in the building. Most
nights, the murder trial was the second story.
During voir dire in Divita v. Ziegler, both media defen-
dants wanted to learn what prospective jurors thought about
Ziegler, his show, and his political viewpoints, and also their
general feelings about and exposure to the shock-jock for-
mat. We believed that the jurors did not need to like
Ziegler's show, but we wanted a jury that at least had expo-
sure to his in-your-face format. For example, if a person
listened to only religious programming or no radio at all, we
feared that they might not be able to get past the strongly
opinionated nature of Ziegler's comments; jurors aware of
shock-jock radio, however, would not be surprised that
shows like Ziegler's were on the air and would understand
that his comments were commonplace on American air-
waves. In addition to learning about jurors' exposure to and
attitudes toward such programming, we began to set our
reality-relationship theme by inquiring about jurors' interest
in reality television, asking prospective jurors questions
such as the following:
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* Do you listen to talk radio?
" Ever listen to Rush Limbaugh or Howard Stern? What do
you think of those shows?
* Do you ever call in to talk-radio shows? What do you
think of people who do?
* Does any one of you watch reality television?
" What are some of the reality shows that you watch?
" Has anyone watched Survivor? Date My Dad? The
Bachelor?
" How about My Big Fat Obnoxious Fianci?
" What do you think about the people who thrust them-
selves into the public eye by volunteering to participate on
these reality shows?
Prospective jurors tended to freely discuss their media
habits in general. It proved to be an excellent way to learn their
opinions of talk radio and to set our reality-relationship theme,
before zeroing in on their perceptions of the defendants.
Interestingly, one potential juror admitted her inability to be
fair and impartial because she did not like Ziegler. Judge
Geoffrey P. Morris struck her for cause. She seemed sincere
and not simply trying to get out of jury duty. This potential
juror's honesty reminded us that although we had to ask dis-
creet questions to learn information and set a theme, direct
questions should not be overlooked.
Fights over a media
defendant's alleged bad
character are always
worth waging.
Voir dire can provide other opportunities to root out and
reduce biases against the media in the courtroom. When there
is an audio or video recording of the broadcast at issue, the
media defendant should consider seeking the court's approval
to play the recording for the prospective jurors. This can be
especially important to accomplish at least two goals. First, it
begins desensitizing the prospective jurors to the statements if
they are shocking in nature. By publishing the broadcast to the
jury early, we hoped, the emotional reactions to the statements
would have subsided by the time deliberations begin. Second,
airing the recording provides an opportunity to strike a juror
for cause if the juror becomes instantly offended and express-
es an inability to overcome a negative emotional reaction to the
statements. Not every judge, however, will allow the state-
ments at issue to be played during voir dire. In Divita, the
judge denied our request to play or read the statements during
voir dire, citing the potential of busting the jury panel, because
so many prospective jurors might be excused for cause that not
enough would remain to try the case.
If the court will not allow the statements to be played dur-
ing voir dire, the trial attorney should consider playing the
broadcast during opening statements. Divita's attorney did not
do this. We did. Not only did this strategy begin the desensiti-
zation process, but it also allowed us to soften the impact of the
broadcast by framing it within our theme of the case-John
and Darcie voluntarily participated in a reality relationship.
The broadcast was played a few more times throughout the
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trial. Indeed, the broadcast was played so often that were it
played one more time, the attorney responsible would risk
upsetting the jury by forcing them to listen to it yet again.
Thus, by playing the broadcast early, we created space and
time between deliberations and the jurors' first exposure to the
broadcast, and effectively closed the door to the impact of hav-
ing the broadcast played late in the trial.
Just as voir dire provides an opportunity to minimize nega-
tive opinions jurors may hold toward the media, motions in
limine permit the media lawyer to educate the judge and pre-
vent harmful evidence from being introduced at trial, or to at
least preserve the record for appeal. We sought to exclude a
variety of evidence that had no bearing on Divita's claims but
did paint Ziegler in a negative light. In an attempt to paint
Ziegler as a vindictive hothead, Divita listed several witnesses
who had seen him angry and others who had been at the
receiving end of Ziegler's ire. Other people identified as pos-
sible witnesses had been blasted on Ziegler's show, including
the former governor of Kentucky. Divita argued that this evi-
dence showed Ziegler had a propensity to lash out at people
on the air if they made him mad and that his quick temper
made this commonplace. Divita also tried to introduce letters
from listeners who complained about Ziegler's show, con-
cerning everything from the content to how his voice
sounded on the air.
When it comes to evidence, the issue of a media defendant's
character can be the trickiest for counsel. If the case involves a
controversial personality such as Ziegler, there is a potential
that the plaintiff will attempt to exploit the defendant's style by
introducing evidence of alleged prior bad acts or bad character
to convince the jury that the defendant deserves punishment. A
primary danger in permitting this type of irrelevant evidence is
that a jury will confuse it with proof of actual malice, usually
the key element in a public-figure defamation case. Because
public officials and public figures receive benefits from being
in the public eye, First Amendment jurisprudence requires a
higher standard of proof when they claim that someone said
something bad about them. As a matter of constitutional law,
actual malice has nothing to do with "malice" as that term is
commonly understood. To prove actual malice, a plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
made a statement with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth. As long as the statement is
true, a public figure cannot recover against a defendant even if
the statement was made with ill will, hatred, or spite. Even a
false statement about a public figure is protected speech as
long as it was not made intentionally or recklessly with regard
to the truth. If it is likely that character evidence may be an
issue, it should be addressed in a pretrial motion in limine.
The Divita trial provides a quintessential example of alleged
bad-character evidence being used by the plaintiff in an
attempt to confuse the jury's understanding of actual malice
and malice as the term is commonly understood. From begin-
ning to end, Divita's case centered on attacking Ziegler's
alleged misogyny-particularly toward her-as well as but-
tressing her theme that Ziegler was an angry, mean-spirited
man. Both Ziegler and the radio station defendant filed pretri-
al motions in limine to exclude this evidence, and we
vigorously objected to its introduction throughout the trial.
Although Judge Morris presided with dignity and carefully
listened to counsels' arguments, he permitted Divita to present
this evidence to the jury. For example, Divita's counsel intro-
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duced Ziegler's dispute with Big Brothers Big Sisters.
Ziegler's little brother was a huge Kobe Bryant fan. When the
story broke about Bryant's alleged rape, Ziegler-who volun-
teered as a Big Brother-asked his little brother on the air for
his thoughts on the matter. By all accounts, both Ziegler and
his little brother had a positive relationship. Nonetheless, Big
Brothers Big Sisters decided this was an inappropriate topic
and ended Ziegler's role as a Big Brother. Ziegler was upset by
this decision. He responded to Big Brothers Big Sisters via
telephone and on the air, expressing his displeasure. The court
allowed witness testimony about this event even though it had
nothing to do with the truth or falsity of Divita's claims, let
alone Divita. Fortunately, this and similar evidence did not
cost the media clients a jury verdict for the defense. Win or
lose, fights over the introduction of evidence of a media defen-
dant's alleged bad character are always worth waging.
Procedural and substantive legal considerations are impor-
tant, but lawyers cannot win media cases without help from the
client. A good corporate representative is invaluable, especial-
ly one who has a solid grasp of the facts, understands the
central legal issues involved, is well spoken, and comes across
as someone to whom the jury can relate. This person is the
media's corporate face.
Kelly Carls, the radio station's program director and the per-
son who had the job of overseeing Ziegler's day-to-day
performance, served as the station's representative at the
Divita trial. In addition to being in the courtroom every day, he
attended every early-morning and late-night trial-strategy
meeting. He listened and provided insight. He did not get in
the way of lawyering, yet he did not sit idle, either. He not only
complemented the trial team but was an essential part of it.
Because of Carls's close working relationship with Ziegler,
he had detailed knowledge of the facts surrounding the case.
Additionally, Carls had a strong understanding of the legal
issues involved. As a bonus, Carls was funny at just the right
time. One on-air comment Ziegler made about Divita was his
belief that she might be a pathological liar. Divita's counsel
seized on the term pathological numerous times throughout
the trial. He grilled Ziegler as to whether he had any medical
experience or qualifications such that he could diagnose
someone as being a pathological liar. Carls endeared himself
to the jury and exhibited his grasp of the issues when he
offered the following responses to Ziegler's counsel during
cross-examination:
Q: Isn't it true, as a matter of fact, that the thing that got
John Ziegler in trouble the most was telling the truth
and not knowing when maybe it would have been
more discreet not to tell the truth?
A: Well, it's not a lie to be silent, and I think there were
times when Mr. Ziegler could have benefited from
being silent as opposed to plunging forward but, yes,
his commitment to telling the truth did have a habit
of getting him in trouble.
Q: And that commitment was almost-was incredibly
intense, was it not?
A: I would call it almost pathological, yes, sir.
This exchange drew laughter from the jury, the gallery, and
even the judge. Carls's simple play on words illustrated the
absurdity of Divita's claim that Ziegler acted with actual mal-
ice, portraying him instead as a bluntly honest person. A
lawyer cannot teach a corporate representative to give witty,
insightful responses at trial, but if you can find someone who
is bright and well spoken, you will have an invaluable tool in
overcoming the burdens faced by the media at trial.
Another key for success in a media trial is turning perceived
weaknesses into strengths, allowing your media personalities
to be who they are rather than asking them to feign being
someone they are not. Although traditional trial strategy calls
for a respectful, toned-down approach on the witness stand, a
media personality often calls for a different strategy. In our
trial, Divita's counsel called Ziegler on direct during the plain-
tiff's case. A word artisan himself, Ziegler did what we instruct
all of our clients to do but what so few learn to master: He lis-
tened to the questions asked, and he answered them precisely.
(Except as indicated, the questioner is Mr. Clay.)
Q: Would you tell us your name, please, sir.
A: John Ziegler.
Q: Mr. Ziegler, are you aware that this trial has been
receiving coverage in the media?
A: Yes, I am.
Q: And yesterday were you aware there was a televi-
sion camera in here, right back where it is right
now?
A: I saw a camera, yes.
Q: Did you make a statement to that camera, sir?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Did you mouth words to that camera?
A: No, I did not.
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Q: You didn't say "this is ridiculous"[-] you didn't
say that?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Or "this is hilarious"[-] you didn't say that?
A: I did not say anything to that camera.
Q: You didn't mouth any words?
A: I did not say anything to that camera. Would you like
to know what did happen?
Q: I would like for you to answer my questions, sir. Did
you mouth words-
A: I said nothing.
Q: May I finish the question. Did you mouth any words
to the camera, sir?
A: No, I did not.
Q: I want to go back just a second, Mr. Ziegler, to the
activities that went on here yesterday, and I asked
you if you made a statement to the [TV] camera
[filming the trial] about moving your lips like that
[silently mouthing an expression]?
Mr. Goehler: Your Honor, I'm confused by what he's
doing.
Mr. Clay: If you'll just wait, I'm going to tell you.
The Court: Just try to answer.
Q. "This is hilarious." You lipped that to someone in
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this courtroom yesterday. Did you do that, Mr.
Ziegler?
A: Yes, I did do that.
Q: To whom did you do that?
A: I did that to John Yarmuth.
Q: Is that your attitude toward this case; that it's hilarious?
A: No, not at all. As a matter of fact, you have no idea
why I said that, or what I was referring to when I said
"this" [silently mouthing an expression]. You have
no idea.
Q: O.K. Well, let's get back to the "this is hilarious."
This is your lipping to Mr. Yarmuth. Go ahead and
tell the jury what that was about.
A: Well, it was a break in the proceedings, and you guys
were all up here [bench conference], and I was frus-
trated by the fact that what was being debated at the
time was whether or not Terry Meiners could be
asked about a statement that he made in an e-mail to
Darcie, in which he claimed to quote an unnamed
former love interest who had allegedly told him
something that my dead mother told me that I
allegedly told this unnamed love interest that sound-
ed nothing like my mother would have ever said. I'm
sorry. I found that to be hilarious. And John is a very
good friend of mine. He's in the courtroom today.
And I turned and I said-[indicating], and that was
all it was about. I found that to be an incredibly
funny moment that my dead mother was being
evoked in a trial that occurs 11 years after she died. I
found that to be hilarious, especially when the com-
ment wasn't real; especially when the comment was
never made to me; it was never made to an unnamed
love interest; it was never made to Terry Meiners. I
found that to be hilarious. And I was blowing off
steam to a friend.
For better or worse, Ziegler's approach on the air, in the
courtroom, and in conversation is honest. In a defamation trial
involving the actual malice standard, his approach was most
certainly for the better. Thus, when dealing with media person-
alities, counsel should not be afraid to allow them to be true to
themselves.
As in all trials, the effective use of jury instructions in a
media trial is critical. Clearly explaining the distinction
between ordinary malice and the counterintuitive definition of
actual malice is a constant concern for media defendants at trial.
An essential way to overcome this confusion is through effec-
P tive use of jury instructions. The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the value of jury instructions for this purpose.
Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989). In Harte-Hanks, the Court held that an instruction on
*, actual malice at the beginning and end of trial and at certain
times during the course of the trial is appropriate. Lawyers rep-
resenting media defendants should take full advantage of
Harte-Hanks and request that the judge instruct the jury on the
definition of actual malice before opening statements, and even
periodically throughout the course of trial. Otherwise, a plain-
tiff may intentionally or unintentionally convey an impression
to the jury that actual malice is established, by showing hatred,
ill will, or spite.
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The jury instructions should make clear that actual malice is
an inquiry into the speaker's subjective belief as to the truth or
falsity of the statements made, not the speaker's subjective atti-
tude about the plaintiff. During closing arguments, lawyers for
media defendants should again highlight the instruction on
actual malice to ensure that the common misunderstanding as
to the meaning of actual malice is dispelled.
Jury instructions may be used for other related purposes as
well. In cases involving multiple allegedly defamatory state-
ments, media counsel can request that a list of the specific
statements upon which the plaintiff bases the lawsuit be pre-
sented to the jury. In West v. Media General Operations, 120
Fed. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit made clear
that a plaintiff required to prove actual malice has the burden
to show that specific statements are false and that the jury
should be provided with the specific statements. In West, a pre-
trial order contained a list of specific statements, but the judge
did not provide the list to the jury during deliberations. The
Sixth Circuit suggested that the list of statements could easily
have been made into jury instructions: "In essence, such a
form would list the statements that Plaintiffs alleged the broad-
cast made about them and that were allegedly false and
defamatory, and then ask the jury to indicate whether Plaintiffs
met their burden of proof on each element of defamation as to
each alleged statement."
In Divita, a list of specific statements benefited the media
defendants because we could easily show that none of the
statements was false. For example, Divita alleged falsity
regarding Ziegler's statements about her breast surgery-yet
she admitted that she had a breast augmentation-and she also
claimed Ziegler defamed her by calling her "the devil," though
the First Amendment and common law protect hyperbolic
opinion that no reasonable person would construe as factual.
Because we did not want the cumulative effect of several truth-
ful statements and non-actionable statements of opinion to go
to the jury in a lump--risking a verdict based not on the law
but on the jurors' dislike of the totality of the comments-we
requested and Judge Morris provided a list separately identify-
ing the specific statements that Divita alleged were false and
defamatory.
Another lesson from our trial, as well as from a recent
defamation trial in Chicago, is that with an effective presenta-
tion, juries can understand and apply actual malice. Do not
underestimate a jury's ability to apply the law even in the face
of bad facts, or even in the face of materially false statements
made without actual malice. Last year, the Chicago Tribune
faced its first libel trial since 1968. A DuPage County prosecu-
tor sued the newspaper for defamation based on 29 words in a
20,000-word, five-part series titled 'Trial and Error: How
Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win." While the Cook County
jury found that the statements at issue were materially false, it
still rendered its verdict for the Chicago Tribune because the
evidence showed that the newspaper did not act with knowl-
edge of the falsity or with reckless disregard. This Chicago
Tribune victory reminded media defense lawyers that the bur-
den of actual malice is high, and that juries can get it.
Like the DuPage County prosecutor in the Chicago Tribune
case, Divita lost because she was unable to prove actual mal-
ice to the jury. Despite a trial filled with evidence of Ziegler's
alleged bad character, the jury correctly applied the law.
Immediately after the trial, the foreperson was interviewed by
a local television station. When asked what made the jury
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reach its conclusion, he stated that it was the definition of actu-
al malice and that he did not know what malice meant until
defense counsel explained the definition during closing argu-
ments. Thus, the defense verdict in Divita shows that a jury is
capable of applying the standard of actual malice despite hear-
ing the unsavory statements that formed the basis of the case
and the plaintiff's tireless efforts to inject irrelevant bad char-
acter evidence in an attempt to muddle actual malice with
malice.
When the actual malice standard is not involved, however,
media defendants' risk of liability increases. For example, in
Aficial v. Mantra Films, producers of the Girls Gone Wild
videos lost a jury verdict of $150 in compensatory damages
and $60,000 in punitive damages in Virginia state court in
2005. Unlike most states, Virginia's law requires written con-
sent before a person's image may be used in a commercial
production. Although the plaintiff gave oral consent for the fil-
We must protect speech
even if we do not like
the message.
ing, Mantra Films did not get her written consent. The low
compensatory damages strongly suggest the jury's lack of
sympathy for the plaintiff; she did give oral consent but took
the case to trial anyway based on the state's written-consent
law. The punitive damages amount represented a mere dollar
for each copy of "Girls Gone Wild: The Seized Video" that
was sold. This damages award probably reflects the jury's dis-
like of Girls Gone Wild films by imposing punitive damages
but keeping them relatively low to avoid giving the plaintiff a
windfall. Aficial is a prime example of how jurors' negative
opinions of certain media defendants can affect the verdict.
Additionally, it shows that the culpability of the plaintiff can
counteract negative opinions jurors hold toward the media.
Divita illustrates the same point. Some or all of the jurors
did not like what Ziegler said about Divita, but her actions
probably helped counteract the negative opinions held against
Ziegler and the media. When Divita moved to Louisville, she
voluntarily participated in a unique reality relationship that had
a public element to it from day one, which helped her gain
exposure as she entered a new media market. Additionally, the
jury did not relate to either Ziegler or Divita. As one juror
noted after the trial, Divita and Ziegler "are not like us." This
simple and insightful statement shows that when jurors do not
relate to the plaintiff, they may discount their own negative
opinions about the media because the media has not harmed
one of "us."
Media attorneys have their work cut out for them at trial.
From the moment they walk into the courtroom, they must
continuously educate judges and juries of the value of such
high standards as actual malice and of the need to protect
speech even if we do not like the message or the style of its
delivery. With careful planning, counsel can help jurors set
aside their biases and recognize that protecting free expres-
sion, even where they find the speech distasteful, in the long
run protects us all. IE
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